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Abstract 
Social decision making is often challenging for autistic individuals.  Twenty autistic adolescents 
made decisions in the socially interactive context of a one-shot ultimatum game, and 
performance was compared to a large matched typical reference sample.  Theory of mind, 
executive functioning and emotion regulation were measured via direct assessments, self- and 
parent report. Relative to the reference sample, autistic adolescents proposed fewer fair offers, 
and this was associated with poorer theory of mind.  Autistic adolescents responded similarly to 
the reference sample when making decisions about offers proposed to them, however they did 
not appear to down regulate their negative emotion in response to unfair treatment in the 
same way.  Atypical processes may underpin even apparently typical decisions made by autistic 
adolescents. 
 
Autism spectrum disorder; ASD; social decision making; emotion regulation; executive 
functioning; theory of mind; 
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Introduction 
Reciprocal social interaction and social communication difficulties are core characteristics of 
autism spectrum disorder (hereafter “autism”) (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013). 
At least half of autistic people2 have an IQ of 70 points or above (Loomes, Hull & Mandy, 2017). 
Despite their normal-range IQ, these individuals often struggle to function in the manner 
expected by society (Farley et al., 2009; Klin et al., 2006; VanBergeijk, Klin, & Volkmar, 2008), 
experiencing poor long term outcomes (Howlin, 2000; Howlin, Goode, Hutton, & Rutter, 2004), 
low rates of employment (Buescher, Cidav, Knapp, & Mandell, 2014; Knapp, Romeo, & 
Beecham, 2009) and poor quality of life (van Heijst & Guerts, 2015). More research is needed to 
understand the mechanisms behind the key social challenges of autism, which may in turn 
facilitate the development of better support strategies (Pellicano, Dinsmore, & Charman, 2014).  
 
The decisions we make in social contexts, which affect ourselves and others – social decisions – 
are a critically important aspect of appropriate social functioning (Tomasello & Vaish, 2013). 
Social decision making is often difficult, anxiety provoking and exhausting for autistic individuals 
(Ahlstrom & Wentz, 2014; Hull et al., 2017).  
 
                                                     
2 In accordance with the wishes of many members of the autism community, we use identity first (i.e., ‘autsitic 
person’) rather than person first (‘i.e., person with autism’) language (Kenny, Hattersley, Molins, Buckley, Povey & 
Pellicano, 2016) 
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Most systematic studies on social decision making in autistic people have reported some 
preserved aspects alongside subtle differences in reasoning and emotional experiences when 
compared to typical controls. For example, autistic individuals appear to be less able to explain 
the reasoning behind their decisions, rely more on the outcome of an event for their decisions, 
make less use of contextual factors such as a social partner’s intentions, and report less 
sympathy and emotional reaction to situations described in vignettes (Buon et al., 2012; 
Channon, Fitzpatrick, Drury, Taylor, & Lagnado, 2010; Channon, Lagnado, Fitzpatrick, Drury, & 
Taylor, 2011; de Martino et al., 2008; Gleichgerrcht et al., 2013; Moran et al., 2011; Morsanyi et 
al., 2010; Shulman, Guberman, Shiling, & Bauminger, 2011; Zalla & Leboyer, 2011).  
Importantly, these findings do not explain the clinical challenges linked to social decision 
making in autistic individuals in a way that is adequate to inform the development of effective 
support strategies.   
 
In developing research into social decision making by autistic individuals that has the potential 
to inform such support strategies, it is important to consider the role of factors that are 
malleable to change.  In line with this objective, theory of mind, executive functioning and 
emotion regulation are intrinsically important in social decision making (Corradi-Dell’Acqua, 
Koban, Leiberg & Vuilleumier, 2016; Funahashi, 2017; Tremblay, Sharika & Platt, 2017), and 
appear malleable to change via psychological interventions.  Indeed, there is growing interest in 
the development of educational/training programmes that aim to influence these factors in 
specific ways (e.g. Berking & Lukas, 2015; de Veld et al., 2017; Kabach & Unger, 2014; Robb, 
Waller & Woodcock, 2015).   
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Both theory of mind and executive function have been repeatedly, if not consistently, 
demonstrated to be impaired in autistic people (Adams, 2013; Craig, Margari, Legrottaglie, 
Palumbi, de Giambattista & Margari, 2016).  Emotion regulation has been relatively poorly 
examined in autism (Mazefsky, Pelphrey & Dahl, 2012), but there is evidence of impairment 
(e.g. Zantinge, van Rijn, Stockmann & Swaab, 2017). Thus, it is plausible that difficulties in 
theory of mind, executive functioning and emotion regulation may contribute to the challenges 
in social decision making faced by autistic people. However, the extent and nature of such 
contributions is currently unclear from the extant literature. 
 
Most studies on social decision making in autistic people have used vignettes about moral 
dilemmas and social trespasses.  However, the ecological validity of such hypothetical scenarios 
is severely limited as they do not attempt to emulate the dynamic, interactive nature of real-
world social decisions.  Strong reliance on vignette methodology may therefore have 
contributed to the lack of prior research capable of informing on support strategies for social 
decision making. 
 
Economic games can begin to circumvent this ecological validity problem by allowing for 
dynamic social interactions (Kishida, King-Casas & Montague, 2010). In this way, such games 
provide an important tool for increasing understanding of everyday social decision making by 
autistic individuals.  Overall, as further elucidated below, application of economic games has 
illustrated a pattern of preserved aspects of social decision making in autistic individuals, along 
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with subtle differences.  Importantly, this research has begun to highlight important roles of 
theory of mind, executive functioning and emotion regulation processes in social decision 
making, although these roles remain poorly described.  
 
In economic games in which participants can decide to cooperate with a social partner to 
differing degrees, decisions about cooperation appear to be broadly similar in autistic and non-
autistic individuals (Chiu et al., 2008; Downs & Smith, 2004; Edmiston et al., 2015; Yoshida, 
Dziobek, Kliemann, Heekeren, Friston & Dolan, 2010; Sally & Hill, 2006; Schmitz, Banerjee, 
Pouw, Stockmann & Rieffe, 2015). And autistic individuals are capable of making decisions that 
rely on high order theory of mind (Pantelis & Kennedy, 2017).  However, autistic individuals 
evidence altered neural activity linked to their decisions in economic games, in brain networks 
involved in theory of mind and related social cognitive processes (Chiu et al., 2008; Edmiston, 
Merkle & Corbett, 2015). Thus, theory of mind is clearly relevant for autistic individuals’ clinical 
picture of social decisions. However, atypical theory of mind may alter the way decisions are 
made rather than the decisions themselves.  
 
In the general population social decisions to cooperate in an economic game appear to draw on 
limited capacity cognitive resources, which are taxed by tests of executive function (Halali, 
Bereby-Meyer & Ockenfels, 2013).  Thus – although to the best of our knowledge, the role of 
executive functioning has not been directly examined in this context in autistic individuals – 
there is a clear mechanism by which impairments in executive functioning linked to autism can 
contribute to this type of social decision making. 
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Finally, an important role of emotion regulation in social decision making by autistic individuals 
has been is implicated.  Differences in functioning in neural networks linked to social cognition 
shown by autistic individuals during cooperative decisions in a laboratory based economic 
game, have been associated with higher levels of salivary cortisol during playground 
interactions (Edmiston et al., 2015).  This suggests that even when making the same social 
decisions as non-autistic people, autistic individuals may experience increased emotional 
arousal whilst making such decisions.   
 
The present study 
Here we aim to examine the impact of theory of mind, executive function and emotion 
regulation on social decision making in autistic individuals.  Since our focus is driven by 
regulatory skills likely to affect social decision making that are malleable to change via 
intervention, we also focus specifically on the adolescent period.  Adolescence is typically 
associated with rapid development of the kinds of regulatory skills under examination here 
(Blakemore, 2012; Casey, Jones & Hare, 2008).  Furthermore, mental illness commonly onsets 
during this period (Merikangas et al., 2010).  Thus, adolescence may be a particularly useful 
period in which to intervene.  We expect that greater impairments in theory of mind, executive 
function and emotion regulation will be associated with a more atypical profile of social 
decisions made by autistic individuals.  However limited prior research on the subject prevents 
us from making more specific hypotheses. 
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Methods 
Methodological approach 
Due to the stated advantages for ecological validity of examining social decision making, we 
employ an economic game. Most prior studies using economic games with autistic individuals 
have focused on the role of a single factor, usually theory of mind. The ultimatum game on the 
other hand, is well suited to examine the roles of multiple factors.  However, to our knowledge, 
the game has only been used in one study with an autistic population (Sally & Hill, 2006), and 
one further study with a population of children with behaviour disorder, in which autism 
symptoms were also measured (Schoorl, van Rijn, de Wied, Goozen & Swaab, 2016). Neither of 
these studies systematically evaluated the effects on social decision making of the three factors 
of interest here.  
 
In the ultimatum game, a proposer is allocated a stake (e.g. tokens or money) and must decide 
on a proportion to offer to their social partner (the responder).  The responder must then 
decide whether to accept or reject the proposer’s offer.  If the offer is accepted, both players 
keep the proposed proportion.  If the offer is rejected however, neither player receives 
anything.  In this scenario, economic theory states that the “rational” response – which leads to 
the highest individual economic gain assuming both players make such rational decisions – is to 
propose the lowest possible offer above zero, and accept any offer above zero. However, in 
general people do not act rationally in this game. Players typically offer 35-50% of the stake, 
and the majority of respondents reject offers of less than 33% of the stake, even though this is 
against their immediate material interests (Güth et al., 1982; Camerer & Thaler, 1995).  
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Importantly, the two player roles in the ultimatum game allow different types of social 
decisions to be examined.  Proposers must make a decision prior to receiving feedback on a 
social partner’s behaviour. Decisions in similar contexts have been examined using other 
economic games in autistic individuals (see above), and the role of social cognitive processes, 
such as theory of mind, has been emphasised. Responder decisions on the other hand, are 
made after information about a social partners’ behaviour is available.  In responder decisions 
therefore, the role of other cognitive processes, such as executive functioning and emotion 
regulation, may be emphasised.  Specifically, typical players experience negative emotion on 
receipt of unfair offers (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996; Sanfey, Rilling, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 
2003) and appear to actively reduce this negative emotion before accepting unfair offers (Harlé 
& Sanfey, 2007; van’t Wout, Chang, & Sanfey, 2010).  Complex versions of the ultimatum game 
involving repeated interactions with the same social partner are available (e.g. Sally & Hill, 
2006).  However, the focus of the present study was on the roles of specific cognitive 
/emotional processes, which have been poorly examined in previous research.  Therefore, a 
paradigm involving a single interaction with each social partner was favoured, in order to 
minimise the potentially confounding influence of repeated social interaction.  
 
Participants 
We recruited twenty autistic adolescents (16 males, 4 females, Mage = 13.3 years, range = 11 to 
17 years; MIQ = 107.7, STDEVIQ=18.1, range = 73 to 141) via a database of consenting prior 
research participants in the London area.  All were attending the appropriate year group for 
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their chronological age, at a mainstream school. Inclusion criteria comprised a clinical diagnosis 
of pervasive developmental disorder according to DSM-IV criteria, a non-verbal IQ score of at 
least 70 (as measured with the Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence scales as a part of previous 
research; Wechsler, 1999), English as a first language, and a chronological age between 11 and 
18 years. Individuals with a substantial delay in language development were excluded.  For 
comparison to the autistic adolescents on key measures, we tested a reference group of 194 
adolescents aged between 10 and 18 years, of whom 80 matched participants (64 males, 16 
females, Mage = 13.3 years, range = 10 to 17 years, no IQ information available) were selected 
for inclusion (see analyses).   
 
The reference sample was recruited from three secondary schools in the north of Ireland 
(convenience sample of schools based on those responding to information letters).  Most TD 
participants were white Caucasian and the schools fell around or below the Northern Irish 
average free school meal entitlement, suggesting a bias away from low socioeconomic status 
(McCauley, 2017), which was similar to the bias expected in the autism sample, linked to the 
fact that individuals volunteered to advertisements to participate in research (Rowley & 
Camacho, 2015).   
 
 
Measures 
The ultimatum game (UG) 
A modified version of the classic paradigm (Güth et al., 1982) ensured suitability for autistic 
adolescents. It was administered via computer; using visual stimuli and pre-recorded verbal 
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instructions constructed using PsychoPy 1.82.01 (Pierce, 2009) (supplementary materials). 
Briefly, participants were led to believe that they were playing the game with a different social 
partner on each trial. Participants first acted as proposers, making fair (50%) or unfair (20%) 
decisions about how to divide £1 (4 trials) and £100 (4 trials) between themselves and a future 
player. Participants then acted as responders, making decisions about whether to accept or 
reject fair or unfair offers made by a previous player of 10 pence, £1, £10 or £100 stakes.   
 
The fixed proportions for fair and unfair offers were selected in line with previous work 
examining the role of emotion regulation in ultimatum game performance (Wang et al., 2011). 
Varying stake sizes were designed to alter the incentive for accepting offers across trials 
because higher material benefit of unfair offers has been shown to more strongly encourage 
participants to down-regulate the negative emotion precipitated by an unfair offer (Tabibnia, 
Satpute & Lieberman, 2008).  It was therefore anticipated that varying stake sizes would allow 
the paradigm to more sensitively index the role of altered emotion regulation processes in 
performance.  Twenty four unfair offers were presented (6 of each stake size), and 12 fair offers 
(3 of each stake size).  
 
Importantly, following each decision as responder, participants were asked to rate the level of 
negative emotion they were experiencing on a Likert-type scale of 1 (completely calm and 
relaxed) to 5 (very annoyed).  The emotion rating scale was adapted from the arousal rating 
dimension of the self-assessment manikin, which has been very widely used in emotion 
research (Bradley & Lang, 1994).  Adaptations were designed to ensure that rating points were 
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easy to relate to by the autistic adolescents, and coincided with words used in previous 
research linking ultimatum game unfair offers to emotional experience (van't Wout et al., 
2010). Since difficulties in distinguishing different emotions are commonly reported in autistic 
populations (Milosavljevic et al., 2016), only negative emotion (specifically anger) was 
considered, in line with the previous evidence linking ultimatum game unfair offers to the 
experience of anger, which underpins the game’s purported links to emotion regulation (Pillutla 
et al., 1996; van't Wout et al., 2010).    
 
Trials were presented in the same pseudorandom order to all participants but features that did 
not influence the trial type (e.g. name of proposer) varied randomly on a trial by trial basis.  
Outcome variables comprised the mean proportion of fair offers proposed (as proposer); the 
mean proportion of fair, and of unfair offers accepted (as responder); and the mean feeling 
ratings to fair and unfair offers; and to fair and unfair offers that were accepted or rejected (as 
responder).  Response times for responder decisions were used as a criterion to identify 
assumed inattentive (erroneous) responses. 
 
The Children's Anger Management Scale (CAMS) and the Children's Sadness Management 
Scale (CSMS)  
The 11-item CAMS and the 11-item  CSMS (Zeman, Shipman, & Penza-Clyve, 2001; Zeman, 
Shipman, & Suveg, 2002) from the Children's Emotional Management Scale (CEMS) were 
administered to all participants. Using a 3-point Likert scale of 1 (hardly ever), 2 (sometimes), or 
3 (often), adolescents responded to items that assess the regulation of anger and sadness 
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respectively.  Items were administered on a computer using pre-recorded verbal instructions 
and a visual aid to illustrate the response options, constructed using PsychoPy 1.82.01 
(supplementary materials). Higher total scores on the CAMS and CSMS indicated more adaptive 
coping with anger and sadness. The CAMS and CSMS have demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistency (Chronbach’s alpha coefficients of .62 to .77) and test–retest reliability (.61 to .80) 
for the individual scales (Zeman et al., 2001) in European samples.  
 
Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF)  
The BRIEF was administered to the parents of autistic adolescents only. The BRIEF is a normed 
measure of the behavioural indicators of executive functioning in children ages 5 to 18 years. It 
has good internal consistency, test-retest reliability, convergent and discriminant validity (Gioia, 
Isquith, Guy, & Kenworthy, 2000), and has been validated in atypical samples (Gioia, Isquith, 
Retzlaff & Espy, 2002).  Eighty-six items are rated on a three point scale. Items correspond to 
eight empirically derived scales tapping 7 executive functions and emotion control.  A 
composite Behavioural Regulation Index (BRI) comprises inhibition, shifting and emotion 
control scales; and other scales load onto a Metacognition Index (MI). A Global Executive 
Composite (GEC) is derived from the sum of the BRI and MI. Raw scores are transformed into 
age- and gender-normed t-scores such that higher scores indicate poorer executive functioning.  
Scaled scores greater than t = 65 are considered clinically significant.  
 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test-Child Version (EYES-C)  
14 
 
Autistic adolescents completed the EYES-C using a tablet computer.  The EYES-C was developed 
as a performance measure of theory of mind  (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), requiring advanced 
mental state attribution and facial emotion recognition. The test has face validity as a measure 
of theory of mind, as it involves attempting to make accurate inferences about mental states 
(van der Muellen et al., 2017). Evidence of construct validity has been demonstrated, as lower 
scores on the EYES-C are associated with conditions that are characterised by theory of mind 
impairments (Baribeau et al., 2015), with theory of mind -related difficulties including poorer 
social skills (Peterson et al., 2015) and less advanced conversational abilities (De Rosnay et al., 
2014). The test consists of 28 items: each item displays a photo of a person's eye and four 
words that describe feelings or thoughts (e.g. 'jealous / scared / relaxed / hate'), and the 
participant selects the word that they think best describes the person's state of mind.  The 
outcome variable is total score, with higher scores indicating better theory of mind ability.  
 
 
Procedure 
Participants provided informed consent and parents consented as appropriate, and as specified 
in protocols, approved by [withheld for blind review] (autistic group) and [withheld for blind 
review] (TD group).  Since the modified ultimatum game exposed participants to events 
expected to precipitate the experience of negative emotion, the Children’s Emotion 
Management Scales were administered before the ultimatum game to better correspond to 
prior use of this previously validated questionnaire. Both assessments were completed 
individually using a personal computer and headphones.  To create the socially interactive 
context of ultimatum game, participants were informed that they were playing with social 
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partners who had previously participated in the research, and prizes were provided to 
incentivize performance. Autistic participants also completed the EYES-C using an ipad, and a 
parent completed the BRIEF on paper.  Autistic participants completed the assessments at 
home during a visit by a researcher.  Typically developing participants completed the 
assessments at school in the schools’ computer laboratory, where several sessions (8-30) were 
conducted in parallel as required to fit in with schools’ demands (see Supplementary materials 
for more details on the procedure).   
 
Analyses 
Matching strategy 
Inclusion of a large typically developing reference group afforded important advantages to the 
present design.  Although the mean IQ of autistic adolescents was around the general 
population mean (107.7), IQ is subject to greater measurement challenges in autistic 
populations relative to typically developing populations because of the autistic profile of 
relative strengths and weakness in the cognitive capacities that contribute to an IQ assessment 
(Grondhuis et al., 2018).  This measurement challenge makes matching for IQ problematic.  
Instead, use of a large reference sample allowed the chronological age of the reference group 
to span the whole of the developmental and chronological age range of the autistic group (e.g. 
see Cornish, Scerif & Karmiloff-Smith, 2007).  Furthermore, since four typical adolescents were 
included for each autistic adolescent, expected individual variability in the typical IQ profiles of 
members of the reference group offered some compensation for the potentially idiosyncratic 
IQ profiles of the autistic adolescents.  Finally, since extreme responding (i.e. rejecting all 
offers), is actually predicted by economic theory, such a pattern of responding should not be 
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considered erroneous.  Our own pilot work with the present paradigm indeed showed that a 
notable minority of participants adopted such a “rational” approach.   The use of a large 
reference sample provided a better approach to considering such expected, low-frequency, 
relatively extreme patterns of responding than would an alternative approach of randomly 
selecting single typical participants to match each autistic participant.   
 
Thus, 80 TD participants were selected from the wider sample (n=194) following exclusion of 
outliers and to match for chronological and developmental age in line with the above 
specifications.  Resultant demographics were as follows: autistic mean chronological age 13.3 
years (95% CI = [12.4, 14.2], range 11-18); autistic mean developmental age 14.2 years (95% CI 
= [13.0, 15.4], range 10.5-17.8); typically developing mean chronological age 13.3 years (95% CI 
= [13.0, 13.7], range 10-18).  Furthermore, the gender ratio was matched at 80% males in both 
groups (see Supplementary materials). 
 
 
Statistical analyses 
Analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics. We employed a combination of regression 
models for ultimatum game performance with offer fairness and group as factors; unpaired t-
tests; and Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients; to examine differences across autism and 
TD groups and associations between social decisions and factors of interest.  Importantly, data 
were reviewed to ensure appropriateness of the tests administered, with particular attention to 
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the uneven sample size of the autistic and reference groups (see Supplementary materials for 
more details). 
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Results 
 
Group differences in ultimatum game decisions as proposer  
On average, autistic adolescents proposed a smaller proportion of fair offers than the TD 
adolescents (Mdifference = -.159, SE = .051, 95% CI = [-0.26, -0.06]; t(55.9) = -3.09, p = 0.003, d = 
0.66:  medium to large effect, Sawilowsky, 2009).  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
Group differences in ultimatum game decisions as responder 
While autistic and TD children responded similarly to fair offers (Mdifference = .019, SE = .021, 95% 
CI = [-0.02, 0.06]; t(98) = 0.903, p = 0.37, d = 0.25:  small effect); on average, TD participants 
accepted a proportion of unfair offers that was 8 percentage points higher than autistic 
participants. However data from autistic and TD groups also showed differently shaped 
distributions. Specifically, TD data showed a bimodal distribution, with adolescents often 
accepting almost all or almost no unfair offers. Whereas the autistic data showed a highly 
positively skewed distribution, with very few individuals accepting almost all unfair offers. Thus, 
there was insufficient evidence in the data that this difference was statistically significant 
(Mdifference = -.079, SE = .093, 95% CI = [-0.26, 0.11]; t(98) = -0.85, p = 0.40, d = 0.22:  small effect, 
further details can be found in the supplementary materials).  
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
Group differences in emotional reactions to offers 
The regression model examining mean feeling ratings, considering fairness (fair, unfair) and 
group (autism, TD) factors (Table 3), revealed a significant group difference (F(1,95.0) = 5.08, p 
= .026) and a significant effect of fairness of offer (F(1,40) = 82.25, p < .001). The effect size of 
the fairness of offer (𝛾10 = −1.65, 95% CI = [-2.02, -1.28]), corresponded to a difference of 
between one and two points on the five-point emotion rating scale (with fair offers leading to 
more positive emotions).  The effect size of group accounted for less than one point on the 
scale (𝛾01 = −0.37, 95% CI = [-0.69, -0.04]; the TD children report less negative emotions 
towards unfair offers than their autistic peers). Further analysis can be found in the 
supplementary materials. 
 
Effects of group were also revealed when examining feeling ratings with respect to whether an 
offer was accepted or rejected (see Table 3).  Despite no significant difference between autism 
and TD groups in negative feeling ratings to unfair offers rejected (Mdifference = 0.34, SE = .267, 
95% CI = [-0.2, 0.9]; t(84) = 1.26, p = 0.21, d = 0.34:  small to medium effect), negative feeling 
ratings to unfair offers accepted were significantly higher in the autism versus TD groups 
(Mdifference = 0.58, SE = .223, 95% CI = [0.1, 1.0]; t(33.1) = 2.58, p = 0.014, d = 0.64:  medium to 
large effect).  For the lower negative feeling ratings reported with respect to fair offers, there 
were no significant group differences between feeling ratings to offers rejected (Mdifference < 0.01 
, SE = .184, 95% CI = [-0.4, 0.4]; t(23) = 0.006, p > .99, d < 0.01:  very small effect) or accepted 
20 
 
(Mdifference = -0.02, SE = .159, 95% CI = [-0.3, 0.3]; t(98) = -0.15, p = 0.884, d = 0.04:  very small 
effect). 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Factors affecting ultimatum game decisions  
 
Self-reported emotion regulation 
Supporting the internal consistency of the CAMS and CSMS in the present samples, total scores 
on these measures were significantly positively correlated in both ASD (ρ = .591, p = .006) and 
TD groups (ρ = .471, p < .001).  However, questioning concurrent validity, there were no 
substantial or significant relationships between CAMS/CSMS subscales and parent reported 
indicators of poor emotional control (autistic group only), as measured by the BRIEF emotion 
control subscale (-.21 < ρ < .37, p > .107).  Furthermore, there were no significant correlations 
between CAMS/CSMS scores and ultimatum game proposer or responder decisions in either 
group (see supplementary materials).  Thus, habitual anger and sadness regulation as reported 
by participants did not appear to be associated with ultimatum game decisions. 
 
On the other hand, when in the context of the ultimatum game, mean feeling ratings towards 
unfair offers were significantly negatively correlated with the acceptance rates of unfair offers 
in the TD group (ρ = -.443, p < .001, 95% CI = [-0.58, -0.28]). Hence, consistent with a role for 
effective emotion regulation in ultimatum game responder decisions, TD participants who 
experienced less negative emotion overall during exposure to unfairness, were those who also 
accepted more of the unfair offers.   However, consistent with an altered role for emotion 
regulation in autism decisions, there was a negligible and non-significant relationship between 
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mean feeling ratings towards unfair offers and acceptance rates of unfair offers in the autism 
group (ρ = -.06, p = .665, 95% CI = [-0.44, 0.34]). 
 
Informant reported executive function and emotion regulation 
Behavioural indicators of executive dysfunction and of emotion dysregulation were measured 
using the BRIEF in the autism group only (see Table 4 for descriptive statistics).   
 
With respect to proposer behaviour, there were no substantial or significant associations 
between the number of fair offers proposed and Global Executive Composite scores, 
Behavioural Regulation or Metacognition indices (𝜌< .16, p> .49). Furthermore relationships 
between number of fair offers proposed and BRIEF subscale scores were weak, not in a 
consistent direction and not significant (-.36 < 𝜌 < .36, p > .12). 
 
With respect to ultimatum game responder behaviour on the other hand, there was a 
significant and large negative correlation between Global Executive Composite scores and 
acceptance rates of unfair offers (𝜌= -.51, p= .021), which appeared to be driven primarily by 
the Behavioural Regulation Index (𝜌= -.52, p= .019), and more specifically, the emotional 
control scale (𝜌= -.54, p= .013). Poorer parent reported emotional control in autistic individuals 
was associated with lower acceptance rates of unfair offers (also see Table 4). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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Theory of mind 
Theory of mind was examined in individuals in the autism group only.  
 
With respect to ultimatum game proposer decisions, higher scores on the EYES-C (M = 19.8, SD 
= 2.94, 95% CI = [19.0, 20.6]), which suggested better theory of mind abilities, were significantly 
associated with more fair offers being proposed (ρ = .55, p = .013).  
 
With respect to responder behaviour on the other hand,  
EYES-C scores were not significantly correlated with the acceptance rates of unfair offers in 
responder trials (ρ = -.10, p = .692).  
Discussion 
Here we examined the profile of decisions made by autistic adolescents in a standardised 
socially interactive context, the ultimatum game; and the roles of emotion regulation, theory of 
mind and executive functioning in such decisions.  Autistic adolescents proposed fewer fair 
offers than their typically developing counterparts, reductions in such fair offers were 
associated with poorer theory of mind; but not with indicators of executive function or emotion 
regulation skill.  On the other hand, responder behaviour by autistic adolescents converged to 
suggest an important role of relatively ineffective down regulation of negative emotion during 
such decision making; whereas theory of mind was less important.  Thus, different types of 
social decisions may be affected in different ways in autistic individuals and should be examined 
separately. 
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Decisions about what to propose 
Decisions about what to propose in the ultimatum game are made prior to information being 
available on a social partners’ behaviour corresponding to that decision. This situation is similar 
to that assessed in other economic games (e.g. trust, Prisoner’s Dilemma, Dictator) that have 
been used with autistic individuals. In general, such prior research has noted relative similarity 
in decisions made across autistic and non-autistic people (Chiu et al., 2008; Downs & Smith 
2004; Edmiston et al., 2015; Li, Zhu & Gummerum, 2014; Sally & Hill, 2006; Schmitz et al., 2015; 
Tayama, Tateno, Park, Ukai, Hashimoto & Saito, 2012); and that autistic individuals can make 
social decisions that depend on a high level of theory of mind skill (also supported Pantelis & 
Kennedy, 2017).  In contrast, the present findings show a clear reduction of fair offers proposed 
by autistic individuals, which was associated with poorer theory of mind.  Importantly however, 
almost all prior research has involved participants repeatedly interacting with the same social 
partner, which differs from the presently examined scenario where each social partner was only 
encountered once.  In an extended social interaction, there is greater opportunity to learn how 
to respond optimally based on prior observations; and motivations to engage socially may 
change (for a relevant review on social motivation, see Chevallier, Kohls, Troiani, Brodkin & 
Schultz, 2016).  Indeed, this possibility is supported by prior research comparing initial and 
subsequent decisions during extended social interactions (Sally & Hill, 2006) and another single 
shot paradigm (Schmitz et al., 2015).  
 
Further research systematically examining social decisions in autistic people as increased 
opportunity is provided for interaction with the same social partner, and the role of theory of 
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mind in such social decisions is therefore much needed. The present results highlight the 
possibility that an initially detrimental impact of impaired theory of mind on social decision 
making can be overcome during an ongoing social interaction. Greater understanding of such 
compensatory mechanisms would have important implications for therapeutic strategies. 
 
Decisions about whether to accept 
Autistic adolescents did not differ statistically from typical peers in the proportion of offers 
accepted. Although on average autistic adolescents accepted fewer unfair offers, there was a 
substantial proportion of typical adolescents who accepted similarly few. Furthermore, autistic 
adolescents did not differ from typical peers in their emotional experience following rejection 
of unfair offers.  However, they experienced more negative emotion following acceptance of 
unfair offers.  Furthermore, whilst typical adolescents who experienced less negative emotion 
after accepting unfair offers, accepted more of these, this was not the case for autistic 
adolescents. These findings suggest that autistic adolescents did not down regulate their 
negative emotional reaction to unfair offers before making their decisions to accept in the same 
way as typical counterparts.  This is consistent with prior research evidencing less adaptive 
emotion regulation in autistic individuals in the absence of alterations in emotion reactivity 
(Patel, Day, Jones & Mazefsky, 2017; Samson, Hardan, Lee, Phillips & Gross, 2015; Zantinge et 
al., 2017).  Thus, as a group the autistic adolescents appeared to be tolerating a higher level of 
negative emotion during social decision making than their typical counterparts.  However, 
autistic individuals who evidenced more everyday behavioural deficits in emotion control 
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accepted fewer unfair offers – suggesting that when emotion regulation is particularly 
impaired, it may affect the resultant decisions, as well as the decision making process. 
 
For those autistic individuals making typical decisions, one interesting possibility is that these 
individuals have learned to make socially appropriate decisions in a different way to their 
typical counterparts, and do not generally employ the psychologically adaptive mechanisms 
that would typically prevent distress or anger in the face of such decisions.  Indeed, when 
external emotional cues are added into the social context, autistic individuals appear to make 
atypical decisions (Ewing, Caulfield, Read & Rhodes, 2015; Klapwijk et al., 2017), evidence 
consistent with an altered balance of emotion processing (Bhanji & Delgado, 2014).  
Furthermore, altered patterns of habitual emotion regulation have been associated with 
decreased mental wellbeing in autistic individuals, for example increased depression (Burns, 
Irvine & Woodcock, 2019; Patel et al., 2017), suggesting that alterations in emotional regulation 
may have psychological implications, not necessarily evidenced in social decisions made.   
 
Importantly, there is evidence that autistic individuals can effectively engage in adaptive 
emotion regulation when instructed to do so (Samson, Hardan, Podell, Phillips & Gross, 2015), 
and even when the neural functional mechanisms are different (Richey et al., 2015).  In 
addition, social learning – in which social decisions are implicit – has been highlighted as a 
possible root of altered emotion regulation in autism (Mazefsky et al., 2013). Thus, with 
increased knowledge on the interactions between the developmental profiles of social decision 
making and emotion regulation in autistic individuals, new possibilities for intervention can be 
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imagined, for example with specific emotion regulation teaching effectively tackling certain 
social challenges.  It will be valuable in future to test this idea using a randomised controlled 
trial design, whereby the impact of emotion regulation interventions upon social functioning 
can be directly evaluated. In addition to elucidating whether emotion regulation has a causal 
influence on real world social behaviour, such studies would add to evidence base to inform 
clinical interventions to support autistic people. 
 
 
Limitations 
Despite the role we have suggested for emotion regulation in ultimatum game responder 
decisions, self-reported habitual regulation of anger or sadness was not associated with 
ultimatum game behaviour.  Our data provided some evidence of internal consistency of the 
Children’s Anger and Sadness Management scales in the present samples, but there was no 
evidence of concurrent validity with parent reports.  Thus, it is possible that the present results 
on adolescents’ self-reported habitual emotion regulation are linked to poor measurement 
validity.   
 
A further limitation related to measurement arises from the application of the BRIEF to 
measure aspects of both executive functioning and emotion control.  Although the emotion 
control subscale of the BRIEF has been separated from executive functioning subscales on a 
conceptual level, factor analyses have still linked this subscale with specific executive functions 
to form a broader index assumed to reflect behavioural regulation (Gioia et al., 2002).  
Presently, we have argued that the relationship between decisions and the behavioural 
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regulation index is being driven by the relationship with emotion control (specifically because, 
of inhibit, shift and emotion control subscales that make up the behavioural regulation index, 
the relationship with decisions is strongest and only significant for the emotion control 
subscale).  However, since relationships with the executive functioning components of 
behavioural regulation are reasonably substantial, it is not possible to rule out a role for these 
processes in the decisions made.  Indeed, depending on the definitions of executive function 
and emotion regulation one adheres to, there is substantial overlap between the two 
constructs, which cannot be addressed in the present design.  Further research with more 
direct measures of emotion regulation and executive function as clearly defined separate 
constructs, would be needed to elucidate this issue.   
 
An additional limitation comes from the fact that despite the previous validity data that have 
been associated to the EYES-C (outlined in the Method section), scores on this test are likely 
influenced by other social and emotional capacities, related to, but conceptually distinct from 
theory of mind, including verbal IQ and facial emotion recognition (Baribeau et al., 2015; van 
der Muellen et al., 2017). Therefore, in future it will be important to triangulate the EYES-C 
findings from this study using other techniques for measuring theory of mind, for example, the 
Strange Stories (White et al., 2009).  In considering the limitations above, it is also important to 
bear in mind that BRIEF and EYES-C measures could only be administered with respect to 
autistic individuals.  Future research should ensure that the relationships identified here can be 
examined across diagnostic boundaries.  Finally, as discussed above, the ultimatum game used 
here has advantages in terms of ecological validity relative to previous research on social 
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decision making, for example with vignettes.  However, the laboratory context and single 
interaction with each assumed social partner remains a long way from real-life social situations.  
In future research it will be important to examine the present findings in naturalistic settings. 
 
 
 
Compliance with ethical standards 
All procedures performed in studies involving human participants were in accordance with the 
ethical standards of the institutional and national research committee and with the 1964 
Helsinki declaration and its later amendments or comparable ethical standards. Informed 
consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the study.   
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Table 1 Proportion of fair offers proposed described as a percentage (from 8 total offers 
made) 
 
Group 
Proportion of fair offers proposed 
Mean SD 
95% CI 
Lower Upper 
ASD 54.4* 16.9 46.5 62.3 
TD  70.3* 31.2 63.3 77.2 
* Indicates a significant difference between ASD and TD groups 
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Table 2 Proportion of ultimatum game offers accepted described as a percentage and as a 
function of the fairness of the offer.  
 
Group 
Fair Unfair 
M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI 
ASD 97.5 6.1 [94.7, 100.0] 39.6 35.4 [23.1, 56.2] 
TD  95.6 8.8 [93.7,97.6]  47.6 37.6 [39.2, 55.9] 
* There were no significant differences between ASD and TD groups. 
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Table 3 Mean feeling rating following ultimatum game responder decisions as separated 
according to offer fairness; and accept versus reject decisions. Feelings were self-rated on a 
Likert scale of 1-5 (1=calm and relaxed, 2= OK, 3= a little annoyed, 4=quite annoyed, 5=very 
annoyed). 
Group Decision               Fair          Unfair 
M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI 
ASD Either 1.38 .387 [1.20, 1.56] 3.03* .740 [2.68, 3.38] 
TD Either 1.42 .707 [1.26, 1.58] 2.67* 1.06 [2.42, 2.90] 
ASD Accept 1.35 .35 [1.18, 1.51] 2.93* .76 [2.54, 3.32] 
Reject .75 .29 [0.29, 1.21] 3.35 .97 [2.86, 3.83] 
TD Accept 1.37 0.69 [1.22, 1.52] 2.35* 1.05 [2.10, 2.60] 
Reject .75 .35 [0.60, 0.91] 3.01 1.02 [2.76, 3.25] 
* Indicates significant differences between ASD and TD groups 
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Table 4 Mean T scores on the Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive Function (BRIEF) for 
individuals in the ASD group (BRIEF not administered to TD individuals). Higher T scores 
indicate poorer executive function. 
 
Mean T 
score 
SD 
95% CI Relationship to  
acceptance rate of 
unfair offers   Lower Upper 
Inhibition  61.9 11.9 58.5 65.3 
𝜌= -.366, p= .112 
Shift 70.2 12.6 66.6 73.7 
𝜌= -.426, p= .061 
Emotional control 66.2 11.5 62.9 69.4 
𝜌= -.544, p= .013* 
Behavioural Regulation 
Index (BRI) 
67.9 12.2 64.4 71.4 𝜌= -.519, p= .019* 
Initiate 66.8 7.7 64.6 68.9 
𝜌= -.412, p= .071 
Working Memory 66.5 7.7 64.3 68.6 
𝜌= -.317, p= .173 
Plan/Organise 62.7 10.6 59.7 65.7 
𝜌= -.474, p= .035 
Organisation of Materials 58.0 11.4 54.7 61.2 
𝜌= -.179, p= .450 
Monitor 65.1 7.8 62.9 67.3 
𝜌= -.476, p= .034 
Metacognition Index (MI) 64.6 7.4 62.5 66.7 
𝜌= -.426, p= .061 
Global Executive 
Composite (GEC) Score 
67.1 8.6 64.6 69.6 𝜌= -.510, p= .021* 
* p values deemed significant to p <.05 are indicated. All correlations are presented here for 
completeness. However, to maintain the risk of type II errors appropriate in the context of 
multiple statistical tests, relationships with higher order composite scores were examined 
first, and those with lower order composite scores were only considered where the 
corresponding higher order composite was also significant. Thus, because the correlation 
with GEC was significant, BRI and MI could be examined.  Of these, only the correlation with 
BRI was significant, so inhibition, shift and emotional control could be examined. This 
procedure follows the same line of inference as a protected t-test procedure, which has 
been demonstrated to be robust at maintaining experiment wise error at an acceptably low 
level (Cohen & Cohen, 1983, page 172). 
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Supplementary materials 
 
Supplementary measures and procedure  
 
Reading the Eyes in the Mind (EYES-C) 
Adolescents with ASD were provided with verbal instructions by the researcher before completing the 
EYES-C using an iPad. 
 
“You are going to play a game on the computer, but before you do that, I need you to answer some 
questions. (Take out iPad) I am going to show you lots of pictures of people’s eyes. Each picture has four 
words round it. I want you to look carefully at the picture and then choose the word that best describes 
what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. Let’s have a go with this one (practice item). Look at 
this person. Do you think he is feeling jealous, scared, relaxed or hate (point to words as they are read)? 
(Make sure child picks one of the options and give encouraging feedback without revealing whether they 
are right or wrong.) OK, let’s have a go at the rest of them. You might find some of them quite easy and 
some of them quite hard, so don’t worry if it’s not always easy to choose the best word. I’ll read all the 
words for you so you don’t need to worry about that. If you really can’t choose the best word, you can have 
a guess.” (Proceed with test items) 
 
Children’s Anger and Sadness Management Scales (CAMS, CSMS) 
Adolescents were provided with verbal instructions by a researcher before completing the CAMS and 
CSMS. 
 
“You are going to play a game on the computer, but before you do that you are going to answer some 
questions about how you cope with difficult feelings like anger or worry or sadness. The computer will make 
a statement like ‘When I’m sad I hide my sad feelings’, and you just have to say whether you do this hardly 
ever, sometimes or most of the time by pressing the numbers 1, 2 or 3 on your computer keyboard.”  
 
On initiation of the computer programme to administer the CAMS and CSMS, adolescents first heard the 
following instructions with corresponding visual aids: 
“We would like you to tell us how you cope with your feelings at different times” 
“You will hear some ways that some people cope with their feelings” 
“All you have to do is to decide how much you use each of the ways to cope with your feelings” 
“You might use it hardly ever” (central picture of a clock with five minutes shaded in red) 
“You might use it sometimes” (central picture of a clock with twenty minutes shaded in red) 
“You might use it often” (central picture of a clock with forty five minutes shaded in red) 
Press 1 for hardly ever 2 for sometimes and 3 for often (hardly ever (left most), sometimes (middle) 
and often (right most) clocks presented 
 
Following these initial instructions, each item of the scales was administered in the order it appears in the 
previously validated paper measure. Although not a focus of the present research, the anxiety scale (11-
items) was administered following the anger and sadness scale. Items were administered as illustrated in 
Figure S1. 
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Figure S1: Trial structure for presenting items of the CAMS and CSMS. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
+ 
+ 1s 
“[Item]” 
“Press 1 for hardly ever, 2 for 
sometimes and 3 for often” 
duration of item 
until response 
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Introduction to the ultimatum game 
Before initiating the ultimatum game a verbal instructions were provided to adolescents by a researcher, 
using props for assistance.  The instructions were as follows. At the end of the instructions below, 
participants completed the ultimatum game proposer procedure (Figure S2). 
“Now you are going to a game on the computer. You will be playing the game against lots of other 
children/people just like you who have taken part in our research. You will play lots of rounds of the game 
and in each round you will play against one of these children/people. So, each round has 2 players – you 
and another child/person. The game goes like this – player 1 is given some pretend money and they have to 
decide how to share it with player 2. They can either decide to give player 2 the same as them, or they can 
decide to give themselves more and player 2 less. Player 2 then gets to decide if they want to say yes to 
player 1’s offer, or if they want to say no. If they say yes, they get the money player 1 has offered them. If 
they say no to an offer, nobody gets any money – the pretend money just goes away.” 
“So, imagine I am the player who has the money to share out. Here I have £100 in £10 notes [show real 
notes].  I might decide to share the money out like this, giving myself £50 and the other player £50, or I 
might decide to share it out by giving myself £80 and the other player £20. So which offer would you prefer: 
sharing the money out so I get £50 and you get £50; or sharing the money out so I get £80 and you get 
£20? If the other player says yes to my offer, the pretend money will be shared out between us in the way I 
have decided – so they will get the pretend money shown here in red and I will get the rest. If the other 
player says no my offer, neither of us gets any money – the pretend money just goes away.”   
[Repeat with coins]. 
Any questions? 
[For ASD participants only]: “You will win a prize for playing the game. You might win a small prize like a 
packet of sweets/crisps or a big prize like a book or a DVD worth about £5 for taking part in our research. 
The better you do in the game, the more chance there is that you will win the big prize.” 
[For TD participants only]: “You may win a prize for playing the game.  The better you do the more chance 
you have of winning a prize.” 
“In the first round of the game, you are going to be the player who shares out the pretend money. The 
computer will show you the pretend money you have to share out, and you press 1 if you want to give the 
other player the same as you, and press 2 if you want to give the other player less than you. You will have 
to make lots of offers to lots of different children/people.” 
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Figure S2: Ultimatum game proposer trial procedure 
[Stake size] was either £1 (as above) or £100, as illustrated with ten £10 notes (see Figure S3). The equal share description was: “You can decide to share it so 
that the other player gets the same as you.  So they would get the money shown in red, and you would get the rest”.  The unequal share description was: “Or 
you can decide to share it so that the other player gets less than you.  So they would get the money shown in red, and you would get the rest.”  The buttons 
description was: “If you want to share it so that the other player gets the same, press one.  If you want to share it so that the other player gets less, press 
two.” Verbal feedback was presented alongside a fixation cross, which depended in content on whether the participant selected the unfair offer (as above), 
or the fair offer (“You chose to offer the other player the same as you”).  Stakes were presented in the same pseudorandom order for all participants across 
the eight proposer trials (trials 1, 2, 5 & 8 presented £1 stakes).  
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Introduction to the ultimatum game responder practice session 
The following instructions were provided to participants after their completion of the ultimatum game 
proposer trial procedure, and before initiation of the ultimatum game responder practice session. 
“Now you are going to play the same game, but this time the other players will decide how they are going 
to share out the pretend money. So, they will decide how much of the pretend money they are going to give 
to you and how much they are going to keep for themselves. You will see a picture of the pretend money 
and the share they want to give to you will be shown in red. You can decide to say yes or no to the share 
they offer you. If you say yes, you get the money shown in red. If you say no, nobody gets any money – you 
don’t get any money and the other player doesn’t get any money – the pretend money just goes away. Any 
questions? After each offer, you will see this picture [show the picture of the emotion rating scale that 
appears in the responder trial procedure] and you will be asked to say how you feel about the other 
player’s offer. If you feel very relaxed and calm about their offer, press 1, if you feel ok about their offer 
press 2, if you feel a little bit annoyed press 3, if you feel quite annoyed press 4 and if you feel very annoyed 
press 5. Are you ready to start the game? This first time is just for practise. You are going to get lots of 
different offers from lots of different children/people just like you who have taken part.” 
 
Ultimatum game responder practice session 
Five ultimatum game responder practice trials were presented prior to the ultimatum game responder trial 
procedure.   
Practice trials were similar in structure to the ultimatum game responder trials (Figure S3), but additional 
verbal explanation was provided to explain the task.  Specifically:  
1. Instead of being introduced to a previous player by their first name and cartoon picture, 
participants were presented with a placeholder image and told: 
“First you will see the picture that the other player has chosen” [4 seconds]. 
2. After being presented with a picture of the stake (always 10 pence), and told: 
“They have ten pence to share” [4 seconds] 
3. Participants were told about the options the proposer has available to them.  Specifically: 
“They can decide to share it out so that you both get the same” (whilst being shown 50% of the 
stake highlighted in red). [4.5 seconds] 
“Or they can decide to share it out so that you get less than them” (whilst being shown 20% of the 
stake highlighted in red). [5.5 seconds] 
4. After being informed about the offer, but before being asked to make a decision (see Figure S3), 
participants were reminded what each of their decisions would mean. Specifically: 
“If you say yes, you will get the money shown in red, and they will get the rest” (whilst being shown 
the picture of the stake with the proposed offer highlighted in red). [6 seconds] 
“If you say no, you won’t get any money, and they won’t get any money either” (whilst being shown 
a blank screen). [6 seconds] 
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Introduction to the ultimatum game responder procedure 
Following completion of the ultimatum game responder practice session, the ultimatum game responder 
procedure (Figure S3) was introduced to participants verbally by a researcher. 
 
“Now you are going to play the same game for real. It’s the same as the practise game you just played. The 
other players will decide how they are going to share out the pretend money. So, they will decide how much 
of the pretend money they are going to give to you and how much they are going to keep for themselves. 
And you have to decide if you want to say yes or no to their offer. If you say yes, you will get the money 
shown in red; if you say no, nobody gets any money. You will be asked to say how you feel after every offer. 
You will get lots of different offers from lots of different children/people. Remember, the better you do in 
the game, the more chance there is that you will win the big prize. Any questions? Are you ready to start 
the game?” 
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Figure S3: Ultimatum game responder trial procedure. The stimuli in each trial illustrated were preceded by a fixation cross (as in Figure S2), presented for 1 
second. 
 
1. [Name] was one of 55, single syllable names (27 most typically female; 28 most typically male), randomly selected (without replacement) on each trial. The 
cartoon is also an example of one of 36 widely known cartoon characters – without a particular emotional association e.g. an image of the young Simba from 
the Lion king was included, but an image of Scar was not included as that image is likely to have a negative association – selected randomly, also without 
replacement. There were 36 trials (see Table S1), so this procedure ensured that participants were presented with a different cartoon and a different name 
on each trial; that different participants were presented with different name-cartoon pairings; and that not all participants received offers from proposers 
with the same 36 names. These features were important because TD data were collected in groups, so it was essential that if participants happened to see 
another participants’ computer screen during play, it did not appear that they were being presented with the same offers.  Furthermore, this procedure 
helped to prevent contamination of information across participants from the same school.  
2. [Stake size] was either “ten pence” (as above), “one pound”, “ten pounds” or “one hundred pounds”, except for one school based in the Republic of 
Ireland, when Euros were used instead of pounds and images were altered accordingly (see Figure S4) for alternative stake photographs.   
 
 
1. “This is 
[name]’s 
picture” 
2. “They have 
[stake size] to 
share, which looks 
like” this” 
3. “They have 
decided to share it 
out so that you 
get less” 
4. “Yes or no to 
this offer?” 
5. “You said yes, 
so you get your 
share of the 
money, and they 
get the rest” 
6. “How do you feel 
about their choice? 
Press 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5, 
depending on how 
you feel” 
2.5s 5s 8.5s until response 6.2s until response 
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3. Two possible proposals were presented. Unfair proposals (as above) comprised 20% of the stake. Fair proposals comprised 50% of the stake, and were 
described as “…so that you both get the same”, and were illustrated with half of the stake being highlighted in red (see Figure S4). Offers (defined by fairness 
and stake size) were presented in the same pseudorandom order for all participants. 
4. Response options were counterbalanced such that half of participants responded with the letter Q to indicate a reject response and a letter P to indicate 
an accept response (as above), and the other half of participants responded with the opposite response mapping. In the TD sample, counterbalancing was 
conducted within each school year group.  In the ASD sample, counterbalancing was conducted within the sample, balanced across ages and gender as far as 
possible.  
5. Verbal-visual feedback was presented following the participant’s decision. If the participant accepted the offer, the photograph of the proposed split was 
presented again (as above).  If the participant rejected the offer, a photograph of an empty money wallet (see Figure S4) was presented, alongside the verbal 
phrase “You said no, so you don’t get any money and they don’t get any money either.”  
6. Participants were asked to rate their emotion on a scale of 1 to 5 where 1 = very relaxed and calm; 2= OK; 3 = A little bit annoyed; 4 = Quite annoyed and 5 
= very annoyed. 
 
 
 
Page 54 of 60 
 
 
Figure S4: £1 (S4.1), £10 (S4.2) and £100 (S4.3) stakes are shown, each with the fair (50%) offer highlighted.  The picture of the empty money walled, which 
was presented to illustrate feedback following a participant’s reject decision is also shown (S4.4). Finally, an enlarged version of the image used to illustrate 
the self-report feeling ratings is shown (S4.5). 
S4.2 
S4.3 
S4.4 
S4.5 
S4.1 
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Table S1: Pseudorandom trial order in Ultimatum game responder trials. Trials were presented in two sessions. Trials comprised 6 unfair of each stake size (24 
unfair trials in total), and 3 fair of each stake size (12 fair trials in total). 
  Session 1 
Trial # 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Stake 
size 0.1 1 10 100 0.1 100 100 1 10 0.1 100 10 0.1 10 0.1 100 1 10 
Fairness fair fair unfair unfair unfair unfair fair unfair unfair unfair unfair unfair unfair fair fair fair unfair unfair 
  Session 2 
Trial # 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
Stake 
size 0.1 1 10 1 0.1 100 10 0.1 100 10 1 0.1 1 1 100 10 1 100 
Fairness unfair unfair fair unfair unfair unfair fair fair unfair unfair unfair unfair fair unfair unfair unfair fair fair 
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Following administration of the ultimatum game 
Following completion of the ultimatum game procedure, participants were asked the following questions: 
“What did you think of the game?”, “Why did you respond in the way you did?”, “What did you think of the 
other players?” (e.g. their age/ gender). Responses indicated that all participants believed that they had 
been playing against real social partners, as had been specified by researchers. 
 
Incentives for good performance in the ultimatum game 
Practical necessity meant that the incentive to perform well in the ultimatum game different slightly across 
the two groups. Whilst individuals with ASD were informed that they would certainly receive a prize but 
that the size of that prize would vary depending on their performance (in fact it was always a £10 Amazon 
voucher), TD participants were informed that some individuals from their school would receive a prize and 
that they would be more likely to receive one if they did better in the game (in fact winners of £5 Amazon 
vouchers were selected randomly).  This is consistent with previous ultimatum game research, that has 
adapted the incentive to the population (Koenigs, Kruepke, & Newman,2010; Radke, Brazil, et al., 2013; 
Sally & Hill, 2006). 
 
 
Supplementary analyses 
Matching procedure 
From the wider sample of TD participants (n=194), six participants with missing data on gender or 
CAMS/CSMS were removed.  Furthermore seven participants were removed because their ultimatum 
game performance suggested responding based on random selection, lack of understanding of the rules, or 
inattention (n=5 where <67% of fair offers and <67% of high stake offers were accepted; n=2 where mean 
response time > 3rd quartile plus 2 inter-quartile ranges).  Ultimatum game data from the ASD group were 
similarly examined for outlying participants.  However, none met the criteria for exclusion, most likely 
because the individual testing procedure helped to ensure participants’ understanding and sustained 
attention.  Following this, both the wider TD sample (n=181), and the ASD sample were classified into 4 
age/gender strata based on estimated developmental ages for ASD participants, and chronological ages for 
TD participants. Developmental ages of participants with ASD were estimated based on IQ scores as 
derived from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999). Within each stratum, for 
every individual with ASD, four TD individuals were selected at random. In doing so, the maximum amount 
of data was used while maintaining the proportions of the strata.  Since in the TD sample, data on 
chronological age were recorded in full years of age only (e.g. for an individual aged 15 years 3 months, an 
age of 15 years was recorded), the number of months was trimmed from the ASD developmental age 
estimate for strata formation (e.g. 15 years, 3 months, would be trimmed to 15 years).  The four strata 
therefore comprised females aged 11 – 13, females aged 14 – 17, males aged 11 – 13 and males aged 14 – 
17 years.  This procedure led to groups matched for chronological age (ASD mean 13.3 years, range 11-17; 
TD mean 13.3 years, range 10-17 years); developmental age (ASD mean 14.2 years, range 10.5-17.8, mean 
IQ 107.7, range 73-141; no IQ data were collected from TD participants but the mean IQ in the ASD sample 
is consistent with IQ expectations for the middle/high socioeconomic status TD sample, at the time of 
testing, Pietschnig & Voracek, 2015; von Stum & Plomin, 2015); and gender ratio (80% males in both 
groups).  There was no significant difference between the estimated mental age of the ASD group and the 
chronological age of the TD group, t(23.3) =.676, p=.506. 
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Normality screening 
It was tested whether variables had a skewness  between -1 and 1 and a kurtosis  smaller than 3 (Kline, 
2013). Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were performed and histograms of the data created. 
However, ultimate judgements on normality were based on the inspection of Q-Q plots, using the previous 
tests as indicators of the plausibility of the judgement. 
 
Statistical analyses 
In examining acceptance rates and feeling ratings in the ultimatum game, multivariable (single level) 
regression models were used, based on multilevel models (MLMs) as described in (Hoffman & Rovine, 
2007; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Weaver & Black, 2015). When the sample sizes of the compared groups are 
uneven, it is likely that their responses --- the dependent variable --- can show inhomogeneous variances. 
While this would break the assumptions for an ANOVA, an important feature of MLMs is that 
inhomogeneous variances can be included in the model. The models used here can be written as: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝛽0  +  𝛽1(fairness of offer)  +  𝑒𝑖(ASD) + 𝑒𝑖(TD) 
𝛽0 =  𝛾00  +  𝛾01(group) 
𝛽1 =  𝛾10  +  𝛾11(group) 
In this notation, 𝑦𝑖 is the dependent variable for participant 𝑖 (the mean proportion of accepted offers and 
the reported feeling of the participant, respectively). The effects of the predictors (𝛽𝑖𝑠) consist of main 
(fixed) effects of the intercept, 𝛾00 (the mean value of the dependent variable when the participant is of 
the ASD group and the offer is unfair); of group, 𝛾01(the difference in the mean of the dependent variable 
when the participant is of the TD group); of fairness of offer, 𝛾10(the difference when the offer is fair); and 
of the group by fairness of offer interaction, 𝛾11(when both the group is TD and the offer fair). The residual 
variances 𝑒𝑖 are modeled as normally distributed with mean zero and were computed separately for each 
group.  
 
Further analyses were performed for feeling ratings, as the interaction between group, fairness and 
whether an offer was accepted or rejected, was also of interest.  However, since acceptance was not 
controlled in the experiment, this interaction was examined using a series of t-tests. 
Degrees of freedom for the MLMs (as well as t-tests when homogeneity of variance could not be assumed) 
were adjusted using Satterthwaite’s method. This can be identified in the text in that the reported degrees 
of freedom include a fractional part. Effect sizes were computed using 𝑑 =  
|𝑀𝐴𝑆𝐷−𝑀𝑇𝐷|
0.5∙(𝜎𝐴𝑆𝐷+𝜎𝑇𝐷)
 and rules of 
thumb for their interpretation were taken from Sawilowsky, 2009. Notably, this estimate for effect sizes is 
independent of the sample size of the groups.  Spearman’s correlations were conducted to examine the 
relationship between theory of mind, executive functioning and emotion regulation variables and social 
decisions made in the ultimatum game. 
 
Supplementary results 
Relationships between social decisions and chronological age 
ASD and TD groups were matched for chronological age. However, individual variability within groups may 
potentially be associated with chronological age, with important implications.  However, the number of fair 
offers proposed was not significantly correlated with chronological age, (ρ = -.183, p = .07).  Furthermore, 
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acceptance rates of unfair offers were not significantly correlated with chronological age, (ρ = .033, p = 
.746). Similarly, given the range of IQ in the autistic sample, relationships between non-verbal IQ and 
ultimatum game decisions and feeling ratings were examined.  However, the number of fair offers 
proposed was not significantly correlated with non-verbal IQ (ρ = -.28, p = .27), and neither were 
acceptance rates of unfair offers (ρ = .30, p = .20). 
 
Group differences in emotional reactions to offers 
Supporting the ability of autistic and TD participants to rate their negative feelings appropriately, as 
expected, feelings were rated most negatively when unfair offers were rejected (ASD: mean 3.35, stdev 
.97; TD: mean 3.05, stdev 1.02).  Feelings were rated less negatively when unfair offers were accepted 
(ASD: mean 2.93, stdev .76; TD: mean 2.35, stdev 1.02).  Feelings were rated least negatively when fair 
offers were presented (and accepted) (ASD: mean 1.34, stdev .35; TD: mean 1.29, stdev .55). 
 
Autistic children on average reported more negative feelings towards unfair offers than TD children.  This 
effect of group accounted for just less than half a point on the emotion rating scale, which is unlikely to 
have arisen due to chance (𝛾01 = −0.37, p = .03). The effect size of the group by fairness of offer 
interaction was of similar magnitude and opposite sign, driven by the fact that autistic and TD children on 
average reported more similar feelings towards fair offers. However, the interaction was not significant 
(𝛾11 = 0.41, p = .08). The standard deviation of negative feeling ratings in the group of autistic children 
was 0.56, in the TD group 0.90; so in both groups there were non-negligible effects related to the 
individuals. That the standard deviations differ suggests that there were individual variability factors that 
were stronger in the TD group relative to the autistic group. Further research could try to find out what 
these effects are. 
 
Table S2 Estimated parameters from the regression models for the mean proportion of accepted offers 
and the reported feeling of the participants, as a function of the fairness of the offers. The data for the 
acceptance of unfair offers were not normally distributed, so the veracity of the results for the acceptance 
model cannot be assured. 
Parameter 
Mean proportion of accepted offers 
Est SE 95% CI 
Fixed Effects    
    Intercept (𝛾00) 0.396*** 0.055 [0.285, 0.508] 
    Group (𝛾01)  0.079 0.063 [-0.047, 0.205] 
    Fairness of offer (𝛾10) 0.579*** 0.078 [0.421, 0.737] 
    Group × fairness of offer (𝛾11) -0.098 0.089 [-0.276, -0.080] 
Variance Components†    
    Residual variance (𝑒𝑖) 0.061*** 0.014 [0.039, 0.095] 
 0.074*** 0.008 [0.059, 0.092] 
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Parameter 
Feeling 
Est SE 95% CI 
Fixed Effects    
    Intercept (𝛾00) 3.029*** 0.129 [2.769, 3.289] 
    Group (𝛾01)  -0.368* 0.163 [-0.693, -0.044] 
    Fairness of offer (𝛾10) -1.650*** 0.182 [-2.018, -1.282] 
    Group × fairness of offer (𝛾11) 0.410 0.232 [-0.050, 0.870] 
Variance Components†    
    Residual variance (𝑒𝑖) 0.331*** 0.074 [0.214, 0.513] 
 0.802*** 0.091 [0.642, 1.001] 
*p < .05.  ***p < 0.001 
†First value: ASD group; second value: TD group 
 
Self-reported emotion regulation 
With respect to ultimatum game proposer behaviour, there was no substantial or significant relationship 
between number of fair offers proposed and habitual anger or sadness regulation as indexed by the CAMS 
or CSMS in either ASD (CAMS ρ = -.063; CSMS ρ = -.066) or TD groups (CAMS ρ = .079; CSMS ρ = -.025). 
 
With respect to ultimatum game responder behaviour, 80% of adolescents with ASD, and 74% of TD 
adolescents accepted all fair offers, so relational analyses focused on acceptance rates of unfair offers.  
Neither CAMS anger regulation or CSMS sadness regulation, were significantly correlated with acceptance 
rates of unfair offers in ASD (CAMS ρ = .144; CSMS ρ = -.198) or TD groups (CAMS ρ = .122; CSMS ρ = .073).  
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